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Negotiation of mutualism: rhizobia and legumes
Erol Akçay* and Joan Roughgarden
Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford University, 371 Serra Mall Stanford, CA 94305, USA
The evolution and persistence of biological cooperation have been an important puzzle in evolutionary
theory. Here, we suggest a new approach based on bargaining theory to tackle the question. We present a
mechanistic model for negotiation of benefits between a nitrogen-fixing nodule and a legume plant. To that
end, we first derive growth rates for the nodule and plant from metabolic models of each as a function of
material fluxes between them. We use these growth rates as pay-off functions in the negotiation process,
which is analogous to collective bargaining between a firm and a workers’ union. Our model predicts that
negotiations lead to the Nash bargaining solution, maximizing the product of players’ pay-offs. This work
introduces elements of cooperative game theory into the field of mutualistic interactions. In the discussion of
the paper, we argue for the benefits of such an approach in studying the question of biological cooperation.
Keywords: mutualism; rhizobium–legume symbiosis; cooperative game theory; negotiation;
evolution of cooperation

1. INTRODUCTION
Mutualistic interactions are ubiquitous in nature and play
important roles in many ecosystem processes. Yet, our
understanding of how they evolved and are maintained by
natural selection has been limited. The apparent dilemma
such interactions present to evolutionary theory lies in the
fact that partners usually undertake costly actions that do
not directly benefit themselves but benefit the other
partner. The problem has been studied within three
frameworks: evolutionary game theory (Denison 2000;
West et al. 2002a), market theory (also called partner
selection; Simms & Taylor 2002) and trade advantage
models (Schwartz & Hoeksema 1998). Both evolutionary
game theory and market theory approaches have focused
on how mutualisms are enforced, i.e. how ‘cheaters’ are
prevented. On the other hand, trade advantage models
aim at predicting under what conditions an exchange of
benefits is advantageous, leaving the distribution of the
benefits open. We propose a new approach based on
bargaining theory that not only both addresses the issue of
cheating and whether exchange is advantageous at the
same time, but also allows quantitative predictions on
the outcome of the interaction to be made. In this paper,
we apply the theory to the symbiosis between rhizobia
and legumes.
Rhizobium is the general name given to a phylogenetically diverse group of soil bacteria that form nitrogenfixing symbioses with leguminous plants. This symbiosis is
among the most important ecological interactions to
humans and ecosystems. It is estimated to globally
produce as much nitrogen as fixed by commercial fertilizer
production (Gordon et al. 2001), and it represents the
most important nitrogen input to many ecosystems. In
addition to this immense practical importance, this
interaction is an excellent model system in which to

study the evolution of mutualisms. Rhizobia are found free
living in the soil and reproduce independent of the
legumes. However, during the symbiosis, rhizobia and
the legume plant coordinate on building a novel plant
organ, called the nodule, which fixes nitrogen. Starting
with the initiation of the interaction, there is extensive
signal exchange between the partners (Lum & Hirsch
2003). The early signals secreted by rhizobia, called nod
factors, are not predictive of symbiotic performance, but
indicate the ability to nodulate the particular plant species.
After a series of coordinated events, rhizobium cells are
taken up into plant cells where they differentiate into
organelle-like structures called bacteroids (Oke & Long
1999). Bacteroids have two membranes: one derived from
the plant, and the other from the rhizobium (Lodwig &
Poole 2003). This feature presumably enables both
partners to control material flow in and out of the
bacteroid. Moreover, recent work has shown that nitrogen
fixation is contingent on continuous shuttling of amino
acids in and out of the bacteroids (Lodwig et al. 2003).
This suggests that coordination is continuing between the
bacteroid and plant cell into the nitrogen fixation phase,
too. In this manner, we hypothesize that rhizobia and the
plant are negotiating the outcome of the symbiosis.
Our model is borrowed with some modifications from
bargaining theory in economics. Bargaining theory
concerns the interaction of two or more parties which
can produce some benefits if they cooperate, but have
conflicting interests in the division of these benefits. Thus,
they try to agree on a contract on this distribution before
embarking on the joint activity. The classic case of such a
situation is collective bargaining between a firm and a
workers’ union. The firm in our case represents an
individual plant, and the union a nodule. Proposals on
the solution of the bargaining problem pre-date game
theory, starting in the 1930s. Early attempts by influential
economists Frederik Zeuthen and John Hicks were
followed by John Nash’s game-theoretic treatments
(Nash 1950, 1953). The synthesis paper by John Harsanyi
(1956) is a classic reference for the early development of
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the field. Nash’s and Zeuthen’s negotiation models make
the same prediction on the outcome of the process. They
show that the solution to the bargaining problem is unique
and maximizes the product of the player’s pay-offs. This
solution is called the Nash bargaining solution (NBS).
The organization of the paper is as follows. In §2, we
derive the growth rates of rhizobium and plant by solving a
simple mechanistic model of metabolism. These growth
rates are then used as pay-off functions in the bargaining
model introduced in §3. We conclude with a discussion on
the possible applications of this approach in connection to
previous models and argue for the utility of cooperative
game theory in studying biological cooperation in §4.
2. METABOLIC MODELS
We introduce simple models of how a plant and a
nitrogen-fixing nodule function and grow by tracking the
dynamics of the metabolites. We assume these dynamics to
be happening within a time-scale of seconds to minutes.
As a result of these dynamics, the plant and the nodule
accumulate biomass at rates rp and rb, respectively. In this
setup, the biomass accumulation rate is a proxy for the
contribution of any dynamical state to the lifetime fitness
of the individual, i.e. we assume that the time-integral
throughout an individual’s lifetime of rb and rp is
proportional to the fitness of an individual rhizobium in
a nodule or a plant, respectively. We further assume that
the plant and the nodule accumulate biomass on a much
slower time-scale (i.e. days) than the metabolite dynamics,
meaning that in the time-scale of leaf and nodule growth,
the sizes of metabolite pools will be at their equilibrium
values for existing leaf and nodule sizes almost all the time.
This observation simplifies the analysis significantly: we
can simply solve for the equilibrium of the metabolite
dynamics while treating the leaf and nodule sizes as
constant and use this equilibrium to determine the growth
rates of the leaves and the nodule.
(a) Sub-model from the plant’s perspective
Figure 1 illustrates the sub-model for the plant’s
functioning. We consider a plant that has leaf area Lp. It
produces carbon at a rate proportional to Lp and sends out
a fraction up to the nodule, resulting in a flux of IC into the
nodule. The remaining part of the photosynthate enters
the carbon pool, Cp. Meanwhile, the nodule exports
nitrogen into the plant at a rate IA, which enters the
nitrogen pool, Ap (for amino acids). New leaf area
synthesis then follows from the two pools, at a rate
Ap$Cp. Both nitrogen and carbon pools ‘leak’ with rate
constants k1 and k2, respectively, accounting for maintenance processes that do not contribute to growth. The
growth rate of the leaf area is given by rp. The following
differential equations describe this system:
dAp
Z IA KCp $Ap Kk1 Ap ;
dt
dCp
Z Lp KIC KCp $Ap Kk2 Cp ;
dt
rp Z Ap $Cp ;

ð2:1Þ
ð2:2Þ
ð2:3Þ

where we set the proportionality constant for the
photosynthesis rate equal to 1, for simplicity. In these
equations, Lp is a constant, owing to the fast time-scale
assumption we made for the metabolite dynamics. We
Proc. R. Soc. B (2007)
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Figure 1. Metabolic model from the plant’s perspective.

solve for equilibrium by setting the left-hand sides of
equations (2.1) and (2.2) equal to zero and calculate rp at
this equilibrium from equation (2.3),

1
rp Z
Lp C IA KIC C k1 k2
2
qﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
K IA2 C 2IA ðIC KLp C k1 k2 Þ C ðLp KIC C k1 k2 Þ2 :
ð2:4Þ
Figure 2 shows the plot of rp versus IC while keeping the
nitrogen flux, IA, constant (figure 2a) and vice versa
(figure 2b). The most prominent feature of the growth rate
function is that the limiting resource switches from being
carbon to being nitrogen. This can be seen in figure 2a: for
low values of the carbon export rate, IC, the growth rate,
rp, does not show strong dependence on it, whereas after a
certain threshold, the growth rate decreases linearly with
increasing carbon export. The same feature can be
observed in figure 2b, where initially the growth rate
increases almost linearly with the nitrogen intake, but
levels off after a certain threshold. The threshold values for
switching from being limiting to not being limiting for
each metabolite are determined by the flux of the other
metabolite.
(b) Sub-model from the nodule’s perspective
What constitutes a fitness proxy for rhizobia in a nodule is
not as obvious as for a plant. Rhizobia in determinate
nodules of soybean are known to accumulate large reserves
of carbon polymers (e.g. poly-b-hydroxybutyrate (PHB);
Denison 2000), which are thought to facilitate reproduction after nodule senescence. Consequently, the size of the
PHB reserves can be thought of as a proxy of lifetime fitness
for rhizobia in determinate nodules. However, in indeterminate nodules, the bacteroids do not accumulate PHB.
Instead, there is a region in the nodule (zones IV and V;
Puppo et al. 2005) where the symbiosis breaks down and
rhizobia start to live on their own (Denison 2000). As these
cells presumably escape to the soil and reproduce after
nodule senescence, the size of this region can be taken as a
proxy of fitness accrued by the rhizobia in indeterminate
nodules. In either of these mechanisms, the allocation of
the incoming carbon is either to ‘selfish’ pathways or to
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Figure 2. (a) Growth rate of the plant at equilibrium versus IC, the carbon flux that the plant is sending out to rhizobium. The
parameters are k1Zk2Z0.1; LpZ1; IAZ0.7. (b) Growth rate drawn versus IA, the amount of nitrogen that the plant is receiving.
ICZ0.7, other parameters are the same as in (a).

nitrogen fixation, and the metabolic model below applies to
both. In this paper, we use the term ‘polymer reserves’ for
the accumulated fitness, with the understanding that the
interpretation of the model for different nodule types can be
different.
The metabolic model for the nodule is illustrated in
figure 3. The nodule receives carbon from the plant at rate
IC, from which a fraction ub is used in the Krebs cycle for
ATP production, while the rest goes into the carbon pool
(Cb). The size of the ATP pool is Eb. Nitrogen fixation
follows using the ATP pool and the nitrogen fixed is
exported to the plant at a rate IA. At the same time, carbon
polymers are synthesized from the rp carbon pool. The
growth rate, rb, of the polymer reserves, Sb, gives the
fitness accumulation rate. The following set of differential
equations describes the nodule’s workings:
dCb
Z ð1Kub ÞIC KkC Cb ;
dt

ð2:5Þ

dEb
Z ub IC KkA Eb ;
dt

ð2:6Þ

rb Z kC Cb :

ð2:7Þ

ð2:8Þ

The behaviour of the growth rate with changing IA and
IC is depicted in figure 4. Unlike the plant, the nodule’s
growth rate does not exhibit a switch between the
resources limiting it. The reason is that the material flow
is linear in the nodule, with only one source of income (IC)
and two paths for output (nitrogen fixation and growth).
In contrast, the plant has two independent sources of
material and two possible outputs, where one of the
outputs (growth) requires input from both pools. This
feature of the plant model means either of the pools can be
limiting for the growth rate.
Proc. R. Soc. B (2007)
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Figure 3. Metabolic model from the nodule’s perspective.

In these equations, kA and kC are parameters that
represent the stoichiometry of the reactions for carbon
polymer synthesis and nitrogen fixation and export, with
IAZkA$Eb. The solution for equilibrium of equations
(2.5) and (2.6) is straightforward and yields for the growth
rate rb,
rb Z IC KIA :

IC

3. NEGOTIATION MODEL
In this section, we introduce a model for how the plant and
the nodule interact in developmental time-scale to
determine the distribution of benefits in the symbiosis.
We propose that the development of the interaction should
be viewed as continuing negotiations between the
partners. This serves as a proximate mechanism of how
the nodule and plant benefit from the interaction, and is
also where natural selection will act.
We model the negotiation game in discrete periods,
which we assume to be significantly longer in duration
than the time-scale of metabolite dynamics. This assumption means that we can use the equilibrium solutions of the
metabolic models. Each period starts with a certain flow of
carbon and nitrogen between the nodule and the plant.
In our negotiation model, this pair of fluxes may be
considered as a ‘contract’. Such a contract is denoted by R
and results in a pair of growth rates, (rb, rp). In each
period, one of the players randomly changes one or both of
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Figure 4. (a) Growth rate of the nodule’s polymer reserves as a function of IA, nitrogen export rate of the nodule, with ICZ1.
(b) Growth rate as a function of IC, carbon flux into the nodule with IAZ0.2.

the fluxes up or down. We conjecture that these changes
happen as a result of random thermodynamic fluctuations.
These random fluctuations, depending on the response
of the opponent to them, may result in the contract
R changing to some other, R 0 Z ðrb0 ; rp0 Þ, so we call
them ‘offers’.
An offer can give rise to three different situations. For
a start, it can result in a lower pay-off for the offering
player, in which case we assume that the player senses
the drop and restores the previous pair of fluxes
immediately. We label this case a withdrawn offer,
which is essentially the same as no offer being made.
Alternatively, if the offer is not withdrawn, there are two
possibilities. If the offer also increases the responding
player’s pay-off, it gets accepted immediately, i.e. the
fluxes remain on their new values throughout the period.
However, if the responding player’s pay-off is lowered by
the new fluxes, the responding player, in a ‘shock’
response, shuts down flow of both metabolites, causing
both players to experience zero growth rate. This
situation, analogous to strikes in union bargaining,
continues until one of the players concedes. If the
offering player is the first to concede, the fluxes recover
to their previous values. If the responding player
concedes, the new fluxes take effect.
The situation described above is a war of attrition, with
the crucial property of players knowing only their own payoff functions. To see what the war of attrition results in,
take a pair of fluxes giving rise to growth rates RZ(rb, rp).
Now, suppose the nodule is making the offer, by
fluctuating the fluxes to bring the growth rates to
R 0 Z ðrb0 ; rp0 Þ, where rb0 O rb and rp0 O rp . The value of
winning in the war of attrition to the nodule is therefore
rb0 Krb , while the cost it pays for staying in the game is rb,
because it could start getting rb immediately by conceding
any time. Likewise for the plant, the value is rp Krp0 and the
cost rp0 . A plausible strategy for the players is to stay in
the game until it is no longer possible to compensate the
suffered cost by winning and growing at the higher rate
through the rest of the period. Thus, the fraction of time
each player will stay in the game can be calculated by
setting equal the cost of staying to the benefit of winning
the war of attrition. This condition is given by:


ð3:1Þ
ð1KpÞ r b0 Krb Kprb Z 0 for the nodule; and


ð1KqÞ rp Kr p0 Kqrp Z 0 for the plant;
ð3:2Þ
Proc. R. Soc. B (2007)

where p and q are the fractions of period the nodule and
the plant stay in the war of attrition, respectively.
Rewriting the equations for p and q, we get:
9
r 0 Kr >
pZ b 0 b>
>
=
rb >
:
ð3:3Þ
0
rp Krp >
>
>
qZ
>
rp ;
If pOq, the nodule wins, and vice versa. Because the
nodule is in the offering position, the growth rates will
change to R 0 if the nodule wins the war of attrition and
remains at R if the plant does so. It follows that
r b0 Krb rp Kr p0
O
;
ð3:4Þ
R 0 is accepted if
r b0
rp
and rejected otherwise. The same argument can be
repeated for the case where the plant is making the offer.
The condition for an offer R 0 by the plant to be accepted
can be shown to be
r p0 Krp rb Kr b0
O
:
ð3:5Þ
R 0 is accepted if
r p0
rb
This rule for assigning the winner of the war of attrition is
also the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of the general
asymmetric war of attrition game (Parker & Rubenstein
1981; Hammerstein & Parker 1982), and the same
conditions hold even if the waiting times between successive
offers are random (see appendix A).
(a) Direction of movement in negotiation
We want to predict the direction of this negotiation process
outlined above. To do that, we look at the three cases
separately. If the offer is withdrawn, there is no movement.
On the other hand, if the offer is mutually beneficial, the
movement increases both players’ pay-off. In the third
case, whether there is movement or not is determined by
equations (3.4) and (3.5). Both of these conditions can be
rearranged in the following, which gives the condition for
an offer R 0 to be accepted, regardless of which player is
proposing it:
R 0 is accepted if

rb0 rp0 O rb rp :

ð3:6Þ

Equation (3.6), along with the rules for the other two
cases, implies that the negotiation process can only move
in the direction of increasing products of growth rates.
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This product is called the ‘Nash product’ in cooperative
game theory, and the NBS is the unique point which is
the maximum of this product. It follows that the
equilibrium of the negotiation process will be the NBS.
Moreover, since equation (3.6) is true for arbitrary
positive pay-off pairs, the NBS is globally stable in the
permissible pay-off space.
The NBS can be found by taking the partial derivatives
of the product function with respect to IA and IC and
equating these to zero. Alternatively, it can easily be
computed numerically using software such as MATHEMATICA
in a few lines (see our code in the electronic supplementary
material). With k1Zk2Z0.1 and LpZ1, the NBS lies at
IAZ0.26 and ICZ0.74. These are actual fluxes of
metabolites predicted by the negotiation model. The
growth rates for the nodule and plant are rbZ0.48 and
rpZ0.22, respectively.
We illustrate how the negotiation works using a
simulation in MATHEMATICA (code available in the
electronic supplementary material). The process
is implemented as successive iterations of the flowchart
depicted in figure 5. Sample trajectories of the process
in the pay-off space starting from three different initial
conditions are shown in figure 6. In this graph, the x- and
y-axes are the rhizobium’s and the plant’s growth rates,
respectively. Each point in this pay-off space corresponds
to a pair of nitrogen and carbon fluxes. Only the points
that lie below the diagonal curve running northwest to
southeast are attainable in our game, i.e. there is no pair of
fluxes that results in pay-off pairs lying above this curve.
This is due to the conflict built into the pay-off functions,
which makes it impossible after some point to improve

growth rate of plant, rp (cm2 d–1)

Figure 5. Flowchart of the stochastic simulation.

0.4

simulation steps
1

200

0.3
NBS

0.2
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0.6
0.8
growth rate of rhizobium, rb (g d–1)

1.0

Figure 6. Trajectory of negotiations in the growth rate space
for three runs of the simulation with different initial
conditions (depicted by open circles, filled circles and filled
squares). The size of the plant, L, is set equal to 1 for all three
runs. The NBS is at rbZ0.48 and rpZ0.22, corresponding to
the fluxes IAZ0.26 and ICZ0.74. The negotiation process,
regardless of the initial conditions, converges to the NBS and
stays there. The grey curve depicts the Pareto boundary of the
game, which is defined as the set of points upon which it is not
possible to increase one player’s pay-off without decreasing
the other player’s.

both players’ pay-off simultaneously, such that an increase
in one player’s pay-off necessarily decreases the other
player’s. This curve is called the Pareto boundary in
economics. The NBS, which is the maximum of the
product, is marked with a red-filled circle. Note that it lies
on the Pareto boundary, so there is no other pay-off pair
that is better for both players. One can also follow the
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Figure 7. The trajectory of negotiations for two of the same
runs as in figure 6 plotted in three dimensions, where the
vertical axis is the product of the growth rates for the
rhizobium and plant. The NBS, which is the maximum of this
product, is at IAZ0.26 and ICZ0.74 and indicated by the
little flag. Both trajectories climb uphill to reach this point.

trajectory of the negotiations in the flux space, which is
shown in figure 7 for the same three runs of the simulation
as in figure 6.

4. DISCUSSION
Our metabolic models, while being simple, succeed in
capturing the basic trade-off faced by a nodule and a plant
during the interaction. We build our negotiation model
upon this mechanistic basis. Our model describes a
general process that can unify two of the previous
approaches to the rhizobium–legume symbiosis in a single
framework. West et al. (2002a) present a model for
evolution of plant sanctions and West et al. (2002b) find
that given the sanctions, nitrogen fixation becomes
evolutionarily stable for rhizobia. On the other hand, the
second approach by Simms & Taylor (2002) suggests a
somewhat different mechanism termed partner selection,
where the nodules are rewarded differentially based on
their performance. Both of these approaches have found
empirical support (Kiers et al. 2003; Simms et al. 2006).
To see how this paper relates to this previous work, we
note that both plant sanctions and partner choice
hypotheses implicate some sort of evaluation and
decision-making mechanism on the part of the plant.
Our negotiation model supplies such an evaluation
mechanism for both players. It is based on random
fluctuations in the material fluxes and requires from the
players only the ability to sense their own benefits and
react to random changes. The shutting down of fluxes in
response to non-beneficial changes can be interpreted as a
shock response, similar to heat shock.
In this setup, a simple decision rule is sufficient to show
that the dynamics converge to the NBS, where players
cooperate and maximize the product of the growth rates.
The decision rule requires information about only the
player’s own pay-off and the expected time to the next
offer. It prescribes staying in the war of attrition as long as
the expected gain from winning it is positive. Staying in the
game longer than that yields a negative expected pay-off to
players relative to immediate concession, even if they win
the war of attrition. Staying for shorter times might be
Proc. R. Soc. B (2007)

beneficial if players know the opponent’s strategy, but
they have no such information. This response rule
provides a simple and plausible way of how the players
might react in all the possible war of attrition games that
can arise during negotiation. The direction of negotiation
predicted by this analysis is also consistent with the ESS
behaviour in a general war of attrition with incomplete
information, as analysed by Parker & Rubenstein (1981)
and Hammerstein & Parker (1982).
A major feature of the negotiation model presented
here is that it aims to predict the actual material fluxes
between the partners, making it immediately testable and
readily applicable to practical problems. Specifically, this
setup, worked out here for the case of a single nodule and
plant, can be extended to the multiple nodule case: a single
plant can simultaneously bargain with multiple nodules
and allocate resources according to how much it benefits
from each of them. The utility of this approach would be
that it can be parametrized and used to generate
quantitative predictions on the distribution of benefits
within a single plant depending on the types and
properties of rhizobium strains, potentially guiding
development of inoculation procedures for agricultural
practice. On the other hand, a direct test of our model can
be done in a species like Medicago, where plants inoculated
at just one site and grown in test tubes can be used to test
the prediction that the benefits are distributed in
accordance to the NBS.
McNamara et al. (1999) argue that the outcomes of
two-player interactions are determined within the
developmental time-scale as a result of a negotiation
process. Our approach agrees with this, but differs from
their model, in that the negotiation rules are pay-off based
and aim for a simple maximization of immediate benefits.
This is a common element of developmental strategies in
many organisms. For example, plants grow their roots and
shoots adaptively by taking into account the amount of
resources obtained from different directions. Such general
developmental strategies, given an appropriate interaction
medium, lead to a negotiation setup and a cooperative
outcome. This is a plausible route to the evolution of
cooperation, which does not involve any altruism or
abstract decision rules.
Finally, we conclude with some comments on the
applicability of bargaining theory and cooperative game
theory, in general, to biological cooperation. Evolutionary
approaches to cooperation have studied whether it can
persist in the face of cheaters. Reciprocity is one of the
main themes that emerge in models of cooperation (for a
review, see Sachs et al. 2004). On the other hand, the
phenomenon of coordination, which usually underlies
reciprocation, is generally overlooked, even though it is
observed commonly in nature (Noë 2006). Most, if not
all, cooperative interactions feature elaborate behavioural,
cognitive and physiological mechanisms to ensure successful coordination. An example of such a mechanism in our
system is the amino acid shuttling between bacteroids and
plant cells (Lodwig et al. 2003) that creates a metabolic
interdependence between the plant and the nodule.
Cooperative game theory is a well-suited framework to
study such interactions, since it specifically models
situations where players can communicate and coordinate
their actions to achieve agreed-upon outcomes. Symbioses
like the rhizobium case here are especially suitable to being
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studied using cooperative games, owing to the intimate
physical association between the partners leading to a high
potential for coordination.
Previously, we have argued for a two-tier approach
using cooperative game theory in investigating reproductive social behaviour (Roughgarden et al. 2006) and here
we extend the argument for the utility of the framework to
interspecific cooperation. As in Roughgarden et al. (2006),
the study presented here models the attainment of a
cooperative outcome within a developmental time-scale,
but it differs from our previous model in that the
negotiation process is derived from an essentially noncooperative game. During the negotiation, situations
of conflict are resolved through a war of attrition,
which results in a loss of pay-off relative to immediate
settlement for both of the players. In our simulations, this
‘inefficiency’ is around 7% of the players’ total pay-off.
Even though this figure is rather small, it nonetheless
means that mechanisms for resolving conflicts in a more
efficient way can be selected for. Such a mechanism might
involve each player signalling their staying times in the war
of attrition and decide upon the winner without a fullblown conflict. This is a possible route to the evolution of
cooperatively playing parties, as in Roughgarden et al.
(2006). Cooperative play might thus emerge in evolutionary time-scale as an adaptation to facilitate the attainment
of a cooperative outcome within an interaction.
To conclude, we believe that an approach focusing on
coordination and communication between parties in
cooperative interactions will be more fruitful than considering only individual decision-making. Cooperative
game theory complements its non-cooperative counterpart
in providing a framework for such an approach. Our model
falls in between these two game theory approaches and
provides a mechanistic basis for cooperation with coordination within a developmental time-scale. At the evolutionary level, we envision that a research programme focusing
on cooperative game theory and the interface with its
non-cooperative counterpart will be the basis for investigating the evolution of cooperation and coordination
mechanisms, leading to a much more complete and
coherent answer to one of the greatest questions in biology.
We thank Rob Pringle and Erin Kurten for their helpful
discussions during this work and two anonymous referees for
their comments on an earlier version of this manuscript.

APPENDIX A. RANDOM WAITING TIMES
BETWEEN OFFERS
The discrete time negotiation setup treats the interval
between successive offers as fixed. This condition can be
relaxed and the period length can be treated as a random
variable, which we call t. Then, the conditions for the
maximum time to stay in the game need to be expressed in
terms of the expected pay-offs. The maximum strategy
that, conditioned on winning the contest, yields a greater
expected pay-off to the nodule than immediate concession
is given by



ðA 1Þ
E ðtKpÞ rb0 Krb Z E½ prb ;
where p is not a fraction of one period but an absolute time
measure now. We are calculating p after an offer is made
(meaning that rb and rb 0 are fixed), so the only random
variable in this equation is t, and we can take the rest out of
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the expectation. If we label the unit in which we measure t,
such that E½tZ 1, then this equation becomes the same as
equation (3.1). The same holds for the plant’s maximum
staying time, q, as well. Thus, equations (3.1) and (3.2) still
apply in a case with random time-intervals between offers.
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